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Hello, and welcome to the "State of 911" webinar series, hosted by the National 911 Program.

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My name is Sherri, and I will be the moderator for today's session.

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The webinar series is designed to provide useful information for the 911 stakeholder community about federal and state participation in the planning design and implementation of Next Generation

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911, or NG911 systems.

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It includes real experiences from leaders utilizing these processes throughout the country.

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Today's session will include an update from the FCC

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on 911 activities, as well as lessons learned when performing statewide network and PSAP or ECC

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cybersecurity assessments in the transition to NG911.

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For closed captioning, hover at the bottom of the zoom screen for meeting controls,

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then click the "cc" button to start viewing the captioning. For more information on National 911 Program webinars, or to access archived recordings or learn more about the Program,

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please visit [911.gov](http://911.gov). Feedback or questions about the webinars can be sent to [National911Team@MissionCriticalPartners.com](mailto:National911Team@MissionCriticalPartners.com). The National 911 Program would also like to make you aware of

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the documents and tools section to the [911.gov](http://911.gov) website and let you know that it's been updated with new resources and improved access.

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911 stakeholders are encouraged to submit links and documents

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that would be of use and interest to 911 colleagues, including policy documents, plans, and reports across several topics, such as Governance, Management, Technical, Operations, and Standards and Best Practice.

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You can access the webpage under the 911 System Resource drop-down menu or scan the QR code

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in the bottom right corner of this slide. Content may be submitted by clicking the online submission form on the left side of the Docs & Tools

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page. The 911 Program would also like to invite you to visit the 911 Telecommunicator Tree of Life and share the name of a remarkable 911 telecommunicator who has inspired you. Share

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your story at [911TreeofLife.org](http://911TreeofLife.org) to honor a special 911 telecommunicator who is making a difference in your community.

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Please note that all participants' phone lines have been put in a "listen-only mode,"

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and this webinar is being recorded. To ask questions of our presenters, feel free to take away one of two actions using zoom's "Q&A"

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feature located on the bottom of your screen in the meeting controls,

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enter your question at any time during the presentation, and it will be entered into the queue. Hover your mouse over the bottom of the page to access

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the meeting controls. Or if you'd like to ask your question "live," use the "Raise Hand" feature to request your phone line to

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be unmuted, and you will be called upon to ask your question.

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Everyone registered for this webinar will receive access to today's PowerPoint presentation and the webinar recording. With that, I'd like to turn it over to Kate Elkins to introduce our first speakers Jill

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Coogan and David Furth, Kate. Thank you, Sherri.

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Today we have David Furth, Deputy Chief, in the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission.

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David has been with the FCC for almost 30 years, and he brings a wealth of experience to his position.

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David's portfolio includes 911 and public safety spectrum issues.

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In addition, Jill Coogan, Attorney Advisor, will be replacing

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Rachel Wehr for the webinar today. Jill specializes in 911-related issues, including 911 Fee

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Diversion issues. David and Jill, it's now your turn. Please take over.

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Thank you so much. Hi, I'm Jill Coogan, and I'm an Attorney Advisor with the Policy and Licensing Division in the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. Today

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I'll be briefing you on recent developments on 911 policy from the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau.

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We're going to start with a discussion of recent developments on 911 Fee Diversion. Afterward, we'll go on to a discussion of location accuracy, RAY BAUM'S Act and some other current 911 issues at

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the FCC. Let's start with what 911 Fee

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Diversion is. One of the principal sources of funding for 911 is fees assessed by states on a per-line basis for phone service. I'm so sorry,

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go back a slide. Yes, we're still on this slide. Thank you so much. Service providers typically collect these fees from consumers through their monthly subscriber bills,

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then remit the fees to the governmental authority assessing the fees.

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However, sometimes the state then diverts the 911 fees

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it collects to a non-911 purpose, thereby reducing the amount available for vital

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911 services. Fee diversion is a significant problem

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in the United States. The FCC has found that from 2012 to 2020, states and jurisdictions diverted over \$1.68 billion in fees collected for 911. Sherri, if we can go to the next slide

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now. Thank you so much. At the end of 2020, Congress enacted new legislation to address 911 Fee

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Diversion. In the Don't Break Up the T-Band Act of 2020, which is Section 902, in Division FF, Title IX of the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021 Congress issued

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new mandates related to preventing 911 Fee Diversion.

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Section 902 directed the FCC to do two things,

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number one issue new regulations on 911 Fee Diversion, and number two create a new Strike Force to study and issue a report on 911

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Fee Diversion. The FCC has now completed both these congressional mandates.

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First, we'll discuss the requirement for new FCC Regulations. Section 902 (c)

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required the FCC to within 180 days, in other words, by June 25, 2021,

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issue final rules designating the purposes and functions for which the obligation or expenditure of 911 fees or charges by any state or taxing jurisdiction authorized to impose such a fee

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or charge is acceptable. Next slide, please, Sherri. In June 2021, the Commission,

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the Commission issued a Report and Order with rules on 911 Fee Diversion.

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You can view the Report and Order at the address shown at the top of this slide.

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The final rules became effective on October 18, 2021.

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Among other provisions, the new rules defined acceptable types of 911 fee expenditures and those that would constitute 911 Fee Diversion, with illustrative examples of each. Under the rules, acceptable

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expenditures for purposes of section 902 include but are not limited to PSAP

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operating, personnel, and administrative costs, pre-arrival instructions, emergency notification systems,

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Next Generation 911, and cybersecurity. Unacceptable expenditures include but are not limited to the transfer of 911 fees to a general fund or other fund for non-911 purposes.

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Using 911 fees to construct non-public safety communications networks, such as commercial cellular networks, and using 911 fees to pay for public safety equipment or infrastructure

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that does not quote "directly support providing 911 services",

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unquote. The rules also allow states and taxing jurisdictions to petition the FCC

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for further clarity on whether other types of 911 expenditures are acceptable or unacceptable. In addition

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the rules provide a voluntary, safe harbor option for multi-purpose public safety fees that include support for 911 services, provided certain requirements are met, such as segregating and not commingling

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the 911 portion of such fees after collection. The new 911 Fee

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Diversion rules can be viewed at 47 CFR Sections 9.21 to 9.26.

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The Commission has received two petitions for reconsideration of its June 2021 Fee Diversion Report and Order.

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One is from the Boulder Regional Emergency Telephone Service Authority (BRETSA), and the other is from a group of 16 Colorado emergency telephone service entities.

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These two petitions are currently under consideration by the Commission. In December 2021, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued a public notice announcing the filing of these petitions and deadlines for filing opposition and

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replies. The comments cycle concluded on January 18, 2022. Next slide, please

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Sherrri. Turning now to the second major Congressional Mandate for the FCC.

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Section 902(d) required the FCC to establish the

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"Ending 911 Fee Diversion Now Strike Force". The statute directed the 911 Strike Force to study and report to Congress

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by September 23, 2021, on "how the Federal Government can most expeditiously end diversion by a state, or taxing jurisdiction of 911 fees or charges".

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Congress spelled out the composition of the Strike Force in some detail. As required by Section 902,

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the Strike Force membership was comprised of state and federal officials, state 911 administrators, public safety organizations, consumer groups and organizations representing 911 professionals.

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The 911 Strike Force held its first meeting on June 3, 2021, and its members worked hard over a very busy and challenging summer.

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Despite the pandemic, wildfires, hurricanes, and other emergencies. The Strike Force held its final meeting

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on September 17, 2021. The 911 Strike Force submitted its report and recommendations to Congress

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on September 23, 2021.

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The report can be viewed at the address at the bottom of this slide.

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Next slide, Sherri. The NET 911 Act under 47 U.S.C

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Section 615a-1(f)(2) requires the Commission to submit an annual report to Congress on the collection and distribution of 911, or E911

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fees or charges by the states,

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the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories and possessions. To gather information, each of

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the FCCs sends a 911 fee questionnaire to 56 states and jurisdictions.

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The extra six jurisdictions are D.C.,

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Guam, Puerto Rico, the U. S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands.

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Our annual report is due to Congress by December 31 of each year, and each annual report contains state-by-state data for the prior calendar year.

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The Commission submitted its 13th Annual Fee Report to Congress on December 31, 2021.

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The report identified five states as diverting 911 funds in the calendar year 2020 New York, New Jersey, West Virginia, Nevada, and New Mexico.

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The reasons why each state was found to be a diverter vary.

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For example, New York was designated as a diverter, because by state law, 41.7% of a 911 related fee it collects is deposited directly into the State General Fund rather than being spent on 911 related

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purposes. Meanwhile, West Virginia was designated a diverter because, during a portion of calendar 2020, it allocated wireless E-911

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fees to subsidize construction of commercial cell towers.

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You can view all 13 Commission's annual free reports to Congress, plus the annual questioner

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submissions from each state at the address at the bottom of the slide.

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Next slide, please, Sherri. Next, we're going to turn to recent developments in location accuracy issues, including E-911

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wireless accuracy and dispatchable location requirements, and some other 911 issues. Over two-thirds of 911 calls in the United States come from wireless phones.

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And these calls may come from either indoor or outdoor locations.

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The Commission's location accuracy rules enable 911 call centers and first responders to more accurately identify the locations of callers.

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The Commission has adopted requirements to improve location, accuracy, or horizontal and vertical, for wireless

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911 calls. Included in these rules, wireless providers must provide dispatchable location or coordinate-based vertical location

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information for the caller. Dispatchable location means a street address, plus additional information, such as a room or floor number, to identify the 911 callers

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precise location. On this slide is a summary of the recent and upcoming compliance

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benchmarks for nationwide commercial wireless carriers to provide horizontal location information to public safety answering points (PSAPs) for 911 calls. As of April 3, 2021

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nationwide carriers, that is AT&T,

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T-Mobile, and Verizon, were required to provide horizontal location, also known as x/y

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location, within 50 meters or dispatchable location for 80% of all wireless 911

calls. Non-nationwide providers, smaller regional carriers, must achieve the same 80% call threshold either by

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April 3, 2021, or within one year of the provider's deployment of commercially operating voice over LTE multi-platform in the provider's network,

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whichever is later. This gives non-nationwide providers additional time to use a multi-platform to boost the percentage of subscribers for which they can technically provide horizontal location data.

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Next slide, please, Sherri. In addition, there are several recent and upcoming deadlines related to the Commission's vertical location accuracy roles, especially in denser urban areas with multi-story

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buildings. PSAPs and first responders may need to know the vertical location,

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the z-axis location of a 911 caller, in addition to a horizontal x/y location or address. Back in 2015

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the Commission established a timeline for implementing a vertical accuracy

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standard with milestones in April 2021 and April 2023 for the nationwide callers in the top metropolitan markets where most multi-story buildings

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are located. Under the current vertical accuracy

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requirements, nationwide carriers must deploy either dispatchable location or z-axis technology, providing location accuracy of plus or minus three meters relative to the handset for 80% of indoor calls.

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Nationwide carriers must meet this vertical location

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accuracy requirement in increasingly large areas on each of three set dates.

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The first such vertical location accuracy benchmark was in April 2021, when nationwide carriers were required to meet it in the top 25 cellular market areas or

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CMAs. The second vertical accuracy benchmark is set for April 2023,

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when nationwide carriers will be required to meet these requirements in the top 50 CMAs.

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Finally, in April 2025, nationwide carriers must meet these vertical location accuracy requirements nationwide. Non-nationwide carriers have one additional year



to meet each of these vertical

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location accuracy benchmarks. In addition, as of January 6, 2022

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the Commission required all CMRS providers to provide dispatchable location with wireless E-911

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calls, if it is technically feasible for them to do so.

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Next slide, please. Ahead of the April 2021 deadline, Verizon, T-Mobile, and AT&T indicated they could not meet the z-axis requirements in time, in part because of

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challenges with testing during the Covid19 pandemic.

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The Commission's Enforcement Bureau (EB)

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then began an inquiry into the provider's compliance with the FCC's deadlines, as well as the current capabilities of z-axis solutions.

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In June 2021, EB entered into Consent

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Decrees with all three providers that resolved these investigations. The Consent Decrees required each carrier

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by June 10, 2021, to start providing PSAPs with the z-axis location information available to the carrier on a nationwide basis rather than just in the top 25 CMAs  
This

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requirement means that z-axis information must be available to PSAPs with 911 calls throughout the United States rather than just in the top markets.

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Next, the Consent Decrees required each carrier to implement compliance plans with specific testing, reporting, and public interest conditions and to each pay a \$100,000

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settlement amount. And the Consent Decrees required the three carriers

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by April 3, 2022, to meet the three meter

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vertical accuracy standard that would have been applicable to them

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on April 3, 2021. The Consent Decrees for Verizon, T-Mobile and AT&T are available with the address shown at the bottom of the slide.

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Next slide, please, Sherri. Now let's discuss recent and upcoming location deadlines for other technologies. Under Section 506, the RAY BAUM'S Act, enacted in 2018, the Commission was required

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to adopt rules to ensure that dispatchable location is conveyed with 911 calls to dispatch centers, regardless of the technological platform used.

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The Commission adopted dispatchable location requirements for certain multi-line telephone systems

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(MLTS), Fixed Telephony, VOIP, Telecommunications Relay Services (TRS) and Mobile Text. The dispatchable location rules and compliance

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deadlines differ, depending on the particular service and whether the device used to make the call is fixed or non-fixed.

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A summary of the regulations is available at the address at the bottom of the slide.

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Next slide, please. The rules for fixed devices, which cannot be readily moved from one location to another, require provision of automated dispatchable location with each 911 call. Automated

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dispatchable location is generated automatically without any action by the 911

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caller. The compliance date is January 6, 2021.

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The rules for non-fix devices, also described as mobile or nomadic devices, which can be readily moved by the user for use at multiple locations or while in motion, require the provision of automated dispatchable

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location with each 911 call, if it is technically feasible, and the provision of alternative location information if an automated dispatchable location is not technically feasible. The compliance deadline for

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non-fix devices was January 6, 2022.

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The requirements for alternative location information vary depending on the particular service.

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For VOIP and Telecommunications Relay Services (TRS), alternative location

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information may be coordinate-based, and it must be sufficient to identify the

caller's

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civic address and approximate in-building location, including floor level in large buildings.

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These services also may provide the caller's register location

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under some circumstances. Mobile text enhanced location

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information also may be coordinate-based, and it must consist of the best available location that can be obtained from any available technology or combination of technologies at reasonable cost.

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Also, note that the July 2020

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z-axis order applies the same standard, the same requirements, and January 6, 2022, deadline to wireless carriers.

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Next slide, please. On October 19, 2021,

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the National Association of State 911 Administrators

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(NASNA) filed a petition asking the Commission to initiate a rulemaking, or alternatively notice of inquiry, to facilitate the transition to NG911.

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Specifically, NASNA asked the Commission to establish FCC

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authority over the delivery of 911 services by originating service providers

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(OSPs) via IP-based emergency services networks (ESInets), set a default demarcation point for the allocation of costs between OSPs and 911 authorities in the

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NG911 environment and establish an NG911

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readiness framework for state and local 911 authorities to initiate a timeframe for OSPs to begin delivering NG911

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calls. On December 20, 2021,

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the Bureau opened a new PS Docket No. 21-479 to address NASNA's petition and released a public notice seeking comment on the petition.

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Comments were filed January 19, 2022, and reply comments were filed

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February 3, 2022. We are now reviewing the comment record.

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Next slide, please, Sherri. Finally, if you're seeking support for an issue relating to any of the 911 policy topics in the FCC's portfolio,

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please reach out to contact us. There is a public safety support center where you can submit a ticket regarding any PSAP questions, problems, and notifications.

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There is also an FCC operation center that is available

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24/7/365 days a year for time-sensitive emergencies. Next slide, please.

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Now we'd like to open the floor for any questions you have about the topics we've covered. David Furth, Deputy Chief of the Public Safety Bureau, is here to help answer your questions.

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Thank you, Jill. I appreciate it. and just as a reminder, now we will start the Q&A

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portion of our session. I do notice that we've had several questions come in via the Q&A

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feature or you also have that option to raise your hand if you would prefer.

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So, with that, I'm going to ask the first question comes in and says, "Are the new Fee Diversion regulations enforceable?"

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Hi everyone, this is David Furth, and I'm delighted to be here on this webinar. And to address that question,

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the short answer is that the regulations are enforceable but within the context of the FCC's jurisdiction.

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But what's important to understand here is Congress did not give the Commission the authority to prohibit Fee Diversion.

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What it gave the Commission authority to do was to collect data and report on Fee Diversion, and there are some consequences, some potential consequences under Federal law

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if a state diverts. Those are principally it can affect eligibility for 911 grants, Federal 911 Grants,

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and it can also affect the eligibility of the diverted jurisdiction to serve on an FCC

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Advisory Committee like CISA, for example, so to that degree one could consider the rules to be enforceable at this at the federal level, but it's important to underscore that the Commission does not have the authority

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to prohibit Fee Diversion outright. All right, thank you, David.

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The next question comes in and says, "Is there a reason why we don't demand better location

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accuracy than 80%?" Well, the 80% figure that's in our rules was developed in a rulemaking that occurred back in 2014 and 2015, and in fact, it was developed based on input not just from industry but

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also from public safety, which specifically advocated for the 80%. What's important to understand about the 80% is that it's really a lowest common denominator requirement.

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It is intended to set a floor, not a ceiling, for performance of 911 location accuracy.

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So, in practical terms, we expect that in order to meet that 80% threshold, carriers are going to need to implement technologies that are going to deliver accuracy

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well above that threshold. But at least for the time being the 80%

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threshold that is the requirement based on the rulemaking that the Commission conducted.

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If the Commission were to consider changing the threshold and potentially raising it,

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that would require another rulemaking. It would require further notice and comment beyond what the Commission has done to this date. Perfect.

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Thank you, David. This following question, I believe, was asked in reference to the conversation about Fee Diversion, and the question is "Quality assurance review, or measures an acceptable expenditure."

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Yeah, I take that to be a question about our Fee Diversion rules.

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And the short answer is that if it's a process that a jurisdiction is using to do quality assurance for 911 so that it's clearly 911 related, then it would be considered an

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acceptable expenditure. And then, the next question asks, "Why is the horizontal accuracy requirement different than the vertical accuracy?"

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Well, it's different both for practical and for historical reasons.

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We've had horizontal accuracy rules for 911 on the book since the late 1990

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when the Commission adopted the original Phase 2 rules, which were only focused on horizontal accuracy, which is essentially trying to pinpoint the caller's location on a map within a radius.

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The vertical accuracy component was added much later in the 2014-2015 proceeding, and it was recognized at the time that it's a different problem set because what you're trying to

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identify is what floor a person is on if they're calling from a multi-story building.

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So, the yards that you're going to use to measure vertical accuracy is inherently going to be different from the yardstick that you use for horizontal accuracy.

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So that's really the reason for the different standards for horizontal and vertical. Perfect.

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Thank you. The following question is about something that I don't think we touched on at all today.

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"Can we please get an update on real-time text deployment?"

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I don't know that we can give you. I can give you a kind of off the top of my head update on real-time text.

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It is, there are rules that the Commission is adopted that require the carriers to deploy real-time text to make it available on some devices, and those rules I know are in effect with a set of deadlines that I think we'll have

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to get back to you on, to give you a fuller update.

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And that implementation of text, real-time text, also applies to text-to-911 so carriers can but are not required to support real-time text.

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It depends on what the PSAP is looking for if the PSAP is capable of accepting real-time text, that a carrier can be required to provide it.

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If the PSAP provides notice, but I don't think that real-time text 911 is widely available yet.

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But we can give you a fuller answer on that after the webinar. Perfect,

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thank you. And we do have time for one more question and then to follow on to what David just said.

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I know we have a lot of questions that have come in those questions that we weren't able to have David answer live,

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we will email and upload the questions and answers when we put the recording of today's webinar on the 911.gov

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website. So, David, the last question that we have time for today,

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"What should a 911 authority do if it finds a carrier consistently misses the location accuracy target that are set by the FCC?"

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Our rules is actually specifically lay out the process that a 911 authority should go through.

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We require carriers to initially engage with the carrier to try to solve the problem, and then, if they're unsuccessful in doing that, then a complaint could be filed with the FCC.

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But our rules for enforcement would require that initial engagement, and but nonetheless if the initial engagement is unsuccessful

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after a relatively short period, then we would certainly accept either an informal or a formal complaint to look into it further. Okay perfect. Thank you again,

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both David and Jill for being here with us. We appreciate the information, and I will reiterate those of you that had questions that we did not get to,

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we will email those and get answers posted once we put the recording of today's webinar up. And so, with that, I am going to once again ask Kate to introduce our next panel

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of speakers. Thank you, Sherri. Pokey Harris serves as the Executive Director of

the North Carolina

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911 Board, responsible for guiding the 17 member Board in identifying issues and making policy decisions based on strategic direction established by the Board.

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They collaborate with all PSAPs across North Carolina, DIT staff and leadership, and the many stakeholder representatives

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of the organizations and associations vested in the delivery of 911 services throughout the state.

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Frank Pozniak serves as the Executive Director for Massachusetts' State 911 Department.

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Frank joined Massachusetts State 911 as their first general counsel.

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in June of 2005. He became Executive Director in November of 2007, and he's responsible for overseeing and maintaining the statewide 911 system for emergency

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services. They provide for an efficient and reliable 911 system for all residents and visitors of the Commonwealth, and provides specialized telephone equipment for people with disabilities and make available funding to communities in

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support of their local 911 call centers. Thank you, Pokey and Frank.

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If you guys could take it away. Yes, ma'am, thank you very much.

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And Mrs. Sherri, you can proceed to the next slide, please, ma'am. So, we've been invited today to speak with you about our respective states in the PSAP cybersecurity assessments that we did most recently. And

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actually using our grant funding that we were so fortunate to receive.

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I always like to set the ground level or set the table for folks to understand

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here in North Carolina, what we're doing so we do have 127 PSAPs that are funded by the North Carolina

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911 Board. One hundred fifteen are what we consider primary PSAPs, 12 are secondary PSAPs receiving transferred calls from their 12 primary PSAPs.

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I like to provide just a little bit of definition that helps to ground the topic that we're speaking in. In our General Statute, the statewide ESInet is defined. Also, in our General Statute in the fund



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distribution, it does set forth that all of the PSAPs must be connected or have migrated to the statewide ESInet.

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It was to have been by July 1, 2021.

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However, covid did keep us from meeting that deadline. We should meet it by June 30,

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of this year. And then the powers and the duties of the Board,

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I always like to bring that out, because particularly when we're talking about our Next Generation

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911, and something like our cybersecurity assessments. I'll draw your attention to item c. Performance Measures for Data Services.

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That is how we were able to manage and oversee our cybersecurity assessments and make that a requirement of the PSAPs here in North Carolina.

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Next slide, please, ma'am. So, we began identifying the need for cybersecurity assessments back in 2017, even before we had inked the contract,

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if you will, moving forward with Next Generation 911. It's always been a focus of the Board for the PSAP cybersecurity and cyber health.

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It's been addressed in our Board goals and even our previous and now current State 911

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Plan. It was not part of the original managed service contract that we had with AT&T

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for our core services delivery. But as I noted, the Board's focus is the security of the ESInet.

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So back in the December of 2018, we did set aside an initial procreation to begin the process for PSAP cybersecurity assessment. We issued a scope of work through our State

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Contract 918. We received a very broad, broad range of responses to that from \$1.1 million to \$6.7 million dollars

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to perform these assessments. So, the Board opted to approve funding for internal efforts and a partnership with DIT.

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The partnership with the DIT, the Department of Information Technology, comes about because the 911 Board is housed at DIT.

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The chair of our 911 Board is the State CIO.

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So, having a partnership with them was most appropriate.

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We, however, reevaluated the resources and the scope of what we wanted to do. So, we issued a second scope of work in August of 2019.

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We received multiple responses to that, but it was more realistically

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aligned with our expectations of the project. A very exhaustive vendor review process took place.

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Assessments of the vendors, and then ultimately selection of the vendor.

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Mrs. Sherri, forward, please. So, our vendor commenced in April of 2020, and with a contracted anticipated completion date of 2021. However, because of covid, we did have

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to extend that about 90 days. We had an initial meeting with the entire PSAP community per region.

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We have four regions in the State. We have a PSAP Regional 911 Coordinator that serves as the liaison.

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So, we took the information to all of the PSAPs so they could understand the process and the initiative and what was taking place.

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We also created a video to introduce the initiative.

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We had rules of engagement that were, that was provided to each of the PSAPs, so they would have a very clear understanding of what was to take place.

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So, we had assessment security campaigns, and these campaigns use the recognized standards for NIST 800-53, CJIS, and FIPS.

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And these four campaigns, or these four areas, focused on security question collection of the internal analysis, which is your processes and your procedures, vulnerability scanning,

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and that was a private network, of course, with AT&T

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firewall as the boundary, and then physical assessments.

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Forward, please, Mrs. Sherri. So, as we began to look at how the best rollout this information to the PSAPs, there was a secure portal managed by the Deputy Chief, now our Chief State Risk Officer, so that the PSAPs

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could have access to this information, very protected information, as denoted in General Statute

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132-6.1. We were very clear about who could have access to that who would be privy to any of the information. We had weekly meetings as an entire project team.

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That was our vendor that was selected, all of our staff, our legal counsel, our Next Generation 911 Manager, Program Manager, and the like, to look at the status that addresses any issues or concerns such as

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when covid became an issue, and we had to pivot just a bit on our schedule.

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Then we also had weekly meetings with the PSAPs that completed their work or their project that week,

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their assessment. We would have an open meeting for everyone, and we did a general overview of the report structure,

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the report outline, the format, no information was disclosed.

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But then for any PSAP who accessed their report out of the portal and they wanted to have private individual meetings,

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then we also scheduled that with them, whoever they wanted to bring to the table. PSAP manager, IT manager, their legal counsel, county manager, city manager, sheriff, chief of police, whoever they wanted to bring to the

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table to discuss that in a private setting, we did. As noted

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covid did impact our project. We did have to extend the contract, but we kept moving forward.

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The PSAP findings, so the risk rating was used for external risk rating,

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that was low, medium, and high, and then we had an internal rating, which was also low, medium, and high.

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Next slide, Mrs. Sherri. So, we had a report to the Board, Executive Staff and Legal Counsel.

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It was a general report, and it was non-PSAP specific.

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Again, noting what I mentioned earlier about access to the individual reports for those PSAPs.

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None of this was general information that was released to any other PSAP or to the public.

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So, this, what came to us really highlighted in the report was the need for cybersecurity, training, policy development and testing, funding.

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Of course, looking at who is going to fund this from a perspective of the initial assessment, and then even looking, and you can see the bullet point, bullet point for the responsible parties for remediation. The managed

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security services are overseen by the Board and assessed by the PSAPs, and then we were provided a list of 10 vulnerabilities

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among the small, medium and large PSAPs. I'm not at liberty to share those with you. I just want to tell you that this was how our report was fashioned and provided to us. So, the final report to the PSAPs, that general

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report I referenced was provided to our 911 Board in June of 2021. Because it was such a significant investment by the 911 Board,

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they did want a bit more information. So, based on the guidance of our legal counsel, we did have it hold a closed session meeting with our Board in August of 2021 so that additional information could

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be provided to them. And we invited three PSAPs, basically representing small, medium and large PSAPs that prevent, presented information about their assessment.

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Of their results, of their findings, how they thought the assessment went, the entire process.

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So that was very good for the Board to understand that it was a very successful project, areas for improvement.

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But then also how that we could continue to help the PSAPs

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and with that, we have discussions for the development of ongoing programs and assessments and remediation.

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We are having discussions with the State National Guard and their group who is responsible for such assessments that we want to partner with them.

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They have a very good standing with the PSAP community with all of our locality.

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So, we're looking at it, partnering with them for ongoing assessments on a staggered or phased approach.

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Again, keeping in mind we did 127 PSAPs in that short time, so we want to look at how to better refine a schedule to do so.

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So, for my friends today, my key takeaways: is to determine that the PSAP has controls to identify, protect, respond and recover from threats,

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very important. Dealing with two threats today in North Carolina. One potentially has impacted the PSAP, and another one we're waiting to determine.

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So, it's happening more and more across the country and across our states.

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So, the locality was the is and was the owner of this deliverable.

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There was no access to the reports by any others. And I think more importantly today; I just want to say that: how appreciative we were to the National 911 Program for the grant opportunity that assisted with this initiative. Mrs.

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Sherri, that concludes my comments, ma'am. All right, Frank, you ready? Yes, I'm ready. Thank you very much.

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Welcome, everybody. The first slide I just want to mention that you that what I didn't include here is that we're, the State 911 Department, were within the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, and I didn't put our location. We're

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located in Middleborough, Massachusetts, which is in the southeast portion of the, of the Commonwealth.

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So, with that, we can move to the next slide. So, a couple things to mention about Massachusetts.

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The first thing to point out is, we are a statewide Next Generation 911 system, and by that, we mean is that we provide the network, the data centers, all the call processing equipment,

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the digital logging quarters are provided through the program directly to our PSAPs.

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And currently, we have 215 of them in the Commonwealth,

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two of them are actually run by the State 911 Department.

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We don't provide CAD to the, to the PSAPs, computer-aided dispatch.

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However, through a grant program that we run, that is an eligible expense so that our PSAPs can apply for CAD through the grant program.

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Our service provider was formally General Dynamics Information Technology.

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We entered into a contract with them in 2014.

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After an RFR process that we issued in, in 2013, and

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when we awarded the contract to them, it was awarded in two contracts,

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five years a piece. However, in April of 2019, they assigned the contract to COMTECH. So COMTECH

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is our current Next Generation provider. Our Next-Gen system was completely installed deployed by December of 2017, and we implemented text-to-911 in December of 2018. The next slide

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please. So now we get to the, our audit, overview of our system.

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We've actually conducted two audits. The first one was conducted in 2016, and before we began a full implementation. And our second audit we just concluded in February of 2022.

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So, the vendor that we used for our audits was QED

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Secure Solutions and they were selected to deduct the audit through our Next Generation

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911 contract. And what I have up here is the section of the RFR

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that deals with intrusion, prevention, and detection.

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And if you look at the last sentence that gives us the, gave us the authority to select a vendor to do the audit working with our Next-Gen.

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provider to conduct a intrusion testing throughout the term of the contract and any renewal thereof.

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So, what we end up doing is internally we look for a vendor to do our audit, and through that process, we selected QED.

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And then working with the Next-Gen provider. The Next-Gen

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provider actually is the one that entered into the contract with

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the QED and paid them and then invoice us. So that's how the payment mechanisms work.

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We are paying for it the State 911 Department through that process, through our Next-Gen

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provider. So that, that's how we brought on QED to do the audit, again through our Next-Gen

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911 contract. So now the next slide, please. So, for both the 2016 and the 2022 audit, QED came to Massachusetts and did it one week on-site

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vulnerability assessment. Prior to that one week, there was a initial meeting, a two-day meeting with the Next-Gen

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provider, and the State 911 Department, just to go over some matters before they actually began the one week of vulnerability assessment. And in 2016, it was actually conducted up at the General

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Dynamics headquarters. And the last audit

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they actually did it down here in our, in our Middleborough office, because in both locations, what was replicated was a PSAP with call processing equipment connected to the, to the network.

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So, all the work that they did was done on-site at the GD IT location in 2016 and here in our office in Middleborough

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this February. What's listed here,

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after that, it is just basically what we, what was in this statement of work. And I think it's pretty standard across, you know, other jurisdictions that have conducted an audit, for instance, the system evaluation, architectural

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review, the application of sufficient security measures and security practices.

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But the bottom line of what was tried to be accomplished during that week is basically an intense one-week assessment, both inside and out of the system.

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Where QED brings all its tools and its knowledge to try to disrupt the 911

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system in some fashion. So that, that's what the goal, and

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that's what they tried to do, and that's what we wanted them to do. And through that process, if you go to the next slide. In the 2016 audit, this is some of the things that they determine through

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the process. And just to back up a little bit, primarily, what with the, what the process entails is they issue a report to us with their findings.

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And you know, after review of that, we meet with our Next-Gen

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provider and go through the report to determine what remediation is needed. So, that's generally the process that was utilized. And back in 2016, a couple of things, three things that were noted and which are on

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this slide is the pivoting issue, with the ability of one PSAP network to see another, and the remediation was pivoting was restricted where possible.

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That some of the workstations, the basic input-output system, didn't have passwords.

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So that was remediated, and passwords were enabled on all workstations. And then arbitrary code execution,

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their policy was set to restrict only needed programs and to disallow all others.

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And so those that remediation was implemented.

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So, moving on to the audit that was conducted just recently in February.

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We just got the report, and you know our reviewing it and similar to the process we used in 2016.



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We're going to sit down and meet with COMTECH. We go through the report and then take it from there as to whether any remediation is needed to our system.

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So, the last point I want to raise is, as I did mention, that we don't

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is the State 911 Department does not provide CAD directly to our PSAPs.

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Like again, they can apply for it. It's an eligible expense under our grant program but is not directly provided.

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But one of the things that that we have been considering and talking about internally is potentially doing a cyber assessment of the CAD systems around the Commonwealth.

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Now, it does present some, somewhat of a problem since there are different CAD systems in place in each of those PSAPs. And I think you know it would most likely have to be on a voluntary basis. But it's

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something that we are thinking about. I think it's something that I think is necessary.

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We feel as necessary. But we just haven't put it into place and just trying to figure out how we could proceed with that.

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So, that concludes my presentation, and that's it. Thank you.

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Mrs. Sherri, thank you so much. I don't know who's going to do the disclaimer on this one.

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Would you like to, ma'am? Sure, so Dave Sankey, who is the State

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911 Director for Nebraska had originally planned to do join Pokey and Frank on this panel, and unfortunately, he was not able to be here today. But he did very kindly provide some information on the physical and

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cybersecurity assessments that are being done right now across the State of Nebraska. And Pokey,

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I don't know if you want to talk about how his state is divided up, or did you have any info to add? Uh, no ma'am, I do not. I'll just do a, first let's see I think that Frank and I are gonna

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split this up. So, Frank, I'll do the first four slides, sir.

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I think that will be good, and then you can pick up the remainder.

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This is, this is how, this is how we roll when we have our counterparts back,

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when things like this happen. But this is just a visualization for Nebraska that, that David wanted to share, just to show how they are regionally blocked out or divided up.

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So, for North Carolina, I can certainly relate to this because we have regions, and that helps us with any of our initiatives of any of our work that we're doing for the coordination of that, for the rollout

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of information. You know I had noted that we had done the PSAP

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review or PSAP kickoff, our initial rollout of information, and we did it regionally.

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So, he wanted to provide this visualization for that. So next slide, please, ma'am. So, they are transitioning from legacy

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911 to Next-Gen 911, and they were looking at two very important facts, just like all of us.

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So, the PSAPs moving from a siloed environment to being part of the interconnected network.

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And that's really what we are, the ESInets, and the network to networks, and cybersecurity attacks are on the rise. As I noted earlier, dealing with two here in the State right now, and that public

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infrastructure is being targeted every day. They did contract with Mission Critical Partners

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back in August of 2021, the MCP

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NetInform Secure Service and the completion by March 31, 2022, which is very fast approaching. And, like us presenting today, we did utilize, he did utilize grant funds for this. So, the cost

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of the assessment was covered by the PSC, or the Public Safety Commission, the Federal

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NG911 Grant funds, of course, 60% of those, and then the 40% matching fund. For

them

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it is a voluntary program. Unlike North Carolina that, we do have a mandate for the PSAPs

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to be part of the ESInet, and thus the information I shared about the requirement for the security of that network. Next slide,

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please. So, they looked at NENA for the standards-based approach.

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They looked at the NENA/APCO IT architecture and the support standards.

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They looked at NIST as well, architecture and cybersecurity standards.

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They looked at TFOPA for those standards, and grading the scorecard, and then the ITIL and ISO architecture as well.

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So again, I can parallel this to North Carolina

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looking at the standards-based approach that was utilized.

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Next slide, please, ma'am. So, the statewide webinars were hailed to explain the program and offer them the opportunity for questions getting folks engaged and involved.

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They did have registration and information gathering. They held that kickoff so that the PSAPs could prepare for their individual assessment.

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Much like we did, then they conducted their own site as assessments the same way that we did.

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We had attempted to do a couple of virtual, but that did not work for us, so we quickly put that on the back burner.

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So here, Dave did want to mention about the physical assessments.

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Then their data is analyzed, much like any of us doing this process.

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And then their final process, a final report was delivered. It was a detailed report of their findings and recommendations.

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They had a remediation workbook along with their executive summary, their PSC,

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and their advisory committee only received a summary of that report. Frank, I'm gonna volley to you, sir.

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Okay. So, Dave listed here is the areas assessed, and I think it's pretty similar to

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the statement of work that, that I had in my slide, and I and Pokey is done down in North Carolina, covering the various areas that he lists here, for instance, the network security firewalls, intrusion and

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detection and prevention. So, I think this is just to give you an idea of various areas that are going to be assessed in, in Nebraska in doing their, in doing their audit. So next slide, please. So, some of the

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primary concerns that they listed there. You know the first one initial concerns by the State CJIS

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Authority. Then there's data security storage and disposal.

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Liability concerns concerning data breach, and then, of course, the \$64,000 question always is, who's responsible for the cost of remediation?

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So, that's a question that would have to be resolved in Nebraska.

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So, on the next slide. So, the projects start, the status appears that the project is going to be completed by the end of

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March. It's a voluntary program in Nebraska, and I think they're hoping that all PSAPs participate.

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But I'm not quite sure what the status of that is, and then they list some recommendations.

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Other procedural in nature and can be implemented without additional funding, and the PSAPs prioritized their needs and budget for future

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security enhancements. And I think that takes it to the end of the slides presented by the press.

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It does. Thank you so much to both Pokey and Frank, and we really appreciate you being able to cover for your counterpart, Dave, as well.

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So that once again brings us to the Q&A portion.

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And just as a reminder, you have the option to type your questions into the Q&A feature or raise your hand.

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The first question that comes in asks: "What are states and localities doing to address TDoS and Swatting attacks." Frank, do you want to go first or

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do you want me to? You can have it? Yeah, go ahead. You go.

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Okay, we stay very engaged with all of our PSAPs.

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Also, here in North Carolina, we have our Risk Office,

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as I mentioned, they have a task force that works very closely with the National Guard.

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So anytime that we receive this information, there's an investigation we try to get to the root of this to find out as much as we can.

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Who's responsible, what's being impacted, and how we can help to alleviate that? Frank?

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Yes, when we hear things of that, that nature, I mean, we certainly contact our Next-Gen

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provider, but we also contact the Executive Office of Technology Services in the Commonwealth,

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EOTSS is the acronym for it to relay that information to get their input.

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So, that's how we kind of triage those situations. All right, thank you.

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The next question Pokey is for you. They're asking, "How did North Carolina keep the report and its findings private when it was paid for with public funds?" That was actually referenced back in the

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presentation, but I'll be happy to address that again, General Statute 132-6.1, particularly item c.

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does speak to that. It makes reference to that it does not require a public agency to disclose security

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features when such reports are completed. We worked very closely with Legal Counsel, very closely with our Risk.

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Officer, who's now our Chief Risk Officer, to ensure that we were in compliance with that. All right, perfect.

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Thank you. And we have time for one more question. and then we will once again take all the questions that we didn't have time to answer here on the webinar,

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we will email them to our attendees, get them to provide written responses and post those along with the recording of the webinar and the slide deck on 911.gov

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So, the final question is, "What was the biggest surprise you found

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having completed these assessments?" For us, and I don't think it would be a surprise,

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I think it was just an eye-opening experience, is that we have a lot of jurisdictions that do not have the resources nor the funding, general fund, budgetary matters to address IT

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much less cybersecurity. So, we're very hopeful that these reports that were delivered to them, that will help them to work within their jurisdictions to look at a roadmap, if you will, to move forward to look

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at the reality of cyber-attacks, the assurance of cyber health,

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how that can help them. So that was, that was one of the things, not necessarily a surprise, but a very eye-opening outcome of this, that we hoped that

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jurisdictions can utilize to move forward.

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Frank, anything you want to add. Yeah, I think you know I think there's gonna be some surprises just we the audit we conducted in February because again our first audit was conducted in 2016 you

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know hadn't fully implemented the system. I mean, we tested it and but it, but it hadn't been implemented yet

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but we still want to do the security audit at that point. And then we fast forward to 2022, you know we've been Next-Gen has been implemented for four or five years.

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And you know, some of the things that we've seen in the report kind of surprised us at this point, and I really can't go much further than that.

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So, I think there's more to come on that, what we're surprised about.

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So, I guess I'm just gonna leave it at that if you don't mind. Thank you.

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No, that is completely understandable. And thank you both again, as well as thank you to all of our speakers today.

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This concludes today's webinar. We appreciate everyone's participation.

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And just once again, as a reminder, an archived version of today's webinar, both the recording and the slide deck, will be available on the 911.gov website in the near future.

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The next webinar is scheduled for Tuesday, May 10 at noon eastern time, and we hope that everyone will be able to join us. Thanks again, and have a great rest of your day.